n a historic decision, the U.S. Supreme Court today ruled that a Texas public school district policy permitting "student led" prayer at high school athletic events was unconstitutional, and violated the separation of church and state.

   "School sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the 6-3 court majority.

   "The delivery of such a message -- over the school's public address system by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer -- is not properly characterized as private speech."

   The decision is one of the broadest in its interpretation of the First Amendment's establishment clause handed down by the court since the historic rulings of the early 1960s which banished mandatory, unison prayer and Bible verse recitation from public school classrooms. Reporting on today's decision, AP writer Richard Carelli noted that the ruling "could carry enormous significance beyond football games or other high school sports events."

   The case, SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. DOE was brought by two families -- one Roman Catholic and one Mormon -- who challenged a policy which permitted students to elect a "speaker" who would deliver an invocation or "message" prior to high school football games, and at school graduation ceremonies. The identities of the plaintiffs were sealed by the courts.

   Last year, a federal appeals court ruled that any prayer at the graduation ceremony had to be "nonsectarian and non-proslytizing." The court decided, though, that an athletic contest lacked the appropriate solemnity for prayer, and was an inappropriate venue.

   Students and some school officials immediately challenged the lower court ruling, though. At one game, Christian parents and students were led in prayer by senior Marian Ward. Defenders of the practice, including Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) -- a religious rights group which represented the Santa Fe district in front of the Supreme Court during oral arguments last March -- claimed that the practice was simply an example of free speech rather than government sponsorship of religion. The issue has been a cultural and political flash point throughout Texas, and in some districts there was open defiance of the circuit court prayer ban.

   Today's ruling again took the court into the complicated, often murky legal waters over where to draw the line between legitimate religious expression and government endorsement of religion. In 1962, the court rejected attempts by New York state to compose a "nonsectarian" prayer for recitation in public schools in the ENGEL v. VITALE decision. In MURRAY v. CURLETT and the combined case ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SCHEMPP (1963), the court declared that unison, mandatory prayer and Bible verse recitation were unconstitutional.

   Graduation prayer led by clergy were struck down in the 1992 case of LEE v. WEISMAN. Justices noted, "The Constitution forbids the state to exact religious conformity from a student as the price for attending her own high school graduation." That same year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a graduation prayer, if "student initiated," would pass constitutional muster.

   Prayer supporters pinned their hopes on the "student initiated" aspect of school prayer, hoping free and "private" speech -- rather than government endorsement -- would legitimize the practice. The prayer was characterized as a "message," and the activity recast as an attempt to "solemnize" an event or gather -- all presumably with the goal of minimizing any government entanglement, or even diluting its religious aura.

   The court firmly rejected those arguments, though, in today's decision.

   "The court's analysis is guided by the principles endorsed in LEE v. WEISMAN," wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the majority. "There, in concluding that a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause, the Court held that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way that establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so... The District argues unpersuasively that these principles are inapplicable because the policy's messages are private student speech, not public speech. The delivery of a message such as the invocation here -- on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school's public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer -- is not properly characterized as 'private' speech."

The delivery of such a message -- over the school's public address system by a speaker representing the student body, under the suprevision of school faculty and pursuant to a schol policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer -- is not properly characterized as private speech."

   The court also rejected arguments that the prayer was somehow non-coercive since people -- including students -- were not required to attend the football game, or participation in the invocation.

   "For some students, such as cheerleaders, members of the band, and the team members themselves, attendance at football games is mandated, sometimes for class credit," wrote Stevens. "The District's argument also minimizes the immense social pressure, or truly genuine desire, felt by many students to be involved in the extracurricular event that is American high school football. The Constitution demands that schools not force on students the difficult choice between whether to attend these games or risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual..."

   ¶    The high court criticized the District's disingenuous policy of trying to justify the prayer ritual by engaging in linguistic sleight of hand. It noted the existence of two policy statements from the Sante Fe District School Board outlining the practice, where the term "prayer" was conveniently replaced with "messages" and "statements."

   ¶    Just how "free" was the speech being exercised? Stevens wrote:

"Granting only one student access to the stage at time does not, of course, necessarily preclude a finding that a school has created a limited public forum. Here, however, Santa Fe's student election system ensures that only those messages deemed "appropriate" under the District's policy may be delivered. That is, the majoritarian process implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced. "

   ¶    The court also tasked the District and its supporters for not recognizing the negative impact of even a "nonsectarian" prayer -- that is, one sufficiently vague and vacuous as to please all religions, yet evocative enough to attract the attention of a deity -- on members of a community. Citing the LEE v WEISMAN case which struck down graduation prayer led by clergy, Justice Stevens noted:

"In LEE, the school district made the related argument that its policy of endorsing only 'civic or nonsectarian' prayer was acceptable because it minimized the intrusion on the audience as a whole. We reject that claim by explaining that such a majoritarian policy 'does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors. At best it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of isolation and affront...' Similarly, while Santa Fe's majoritarian election might ensure that most of the students are represented, it does nothing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely serves to intensify their offense."

   ¶    The district was still deeply involved in the selection, character and execution of the prayer ritual despite the veneer of holding student elections and allowing, in theory, a student to "choose" a message, prayer or invocation.

"And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets that they may be seen of men. Verily, I say unto you, They have their reward... "But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou has shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeith in secret shall reward thee openly..." -- The Gospel of St. Matthew Chapter 6 5:6

"Contrary to the District's repeated assertions that it has adopted a 'hands-off' approach to the pregame invocation, the realities of the situation plainly reveal that its policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of religion. In this case, as we found in LEE, the 'degree of school involvement' makes it clear that the pregame prayers bear 'the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position.' "

   ¶    How sincere was the school district's claim that the purpose of the prayer or student-initiated "message was to "solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition," as the district policy statement maintained? Justice Stevens observed:

"The text and history of this (District) policy, moreover, reinforce our objective student's perception that the prayer is, in actuality, encouraged by the school. When a government entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the government's characterization is, of course, entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to 'distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere one...' "

   Writing for the three dissenters, Chief Justice William Rhenquist characterized the ruling in SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. DOE as one bristling "with hostility to all things religious in public life." He then regurgitated arguments frequently associated with "ceremonial deism," such as George Washington's proclamation for a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer." He also attacked the "Lemon" test (derived from LEMON v. KURTZMAN in 1971). That test has become a widely used device in helping courts determine when government policies are in violation of the First Amendment. It states:

"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "

   Rhenquist also opined that despite the sneaky rewording of school policy and other facts of the case discussed at length by Justice Stevens, the prayer or "message" had a secular purpose. He also suggested that prom queens, or even a student body president, might be elected to deliver a message that could indeed be religious in content, but might also involve different subject matter.

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